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INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR
PHOLIFgHATION AND 'l'1I1~ U.S.
HI~SPONSI~:
A POLICY PROPOSAL
Mark Frccman
In IH47 India gained indepcndencc from Grcat
Britain. As a condition of indcpcndclll:c thc nation
of Pakistan was ncated in an cffort. to rcsolvc a
ccnturics-old religious and social conllid bctwccn
India's Moslcms and IlilHlus.
Dcspite t.his drol"t,
Moslcm Pakist.an and lIindu India havc fought thrce
separate wars since 1~H 7, thc most recent in 1H7 I.
Following the 1B71 war, both nations embarked on
the development or a nudcar wcapons capability.
Today, there is a gcncral consensus that bot.h
nalions are nudcar-capablc.
This conscnslls was
voiccd by Ashok Kapur of the Univcrsity of
Waterloo:
"It must bc rccognizcd
that t.hc
nudearization of India and Pakistan has olTurrt'd;
the capabilit.y t.o make one or more nuclear bombs
exists, and has existcd fill" some timc" (Kapur in
DeWitt 1H87, 2()H).
lIowever, nudear capability
cannot be confuscd with deploymenl. Slates K'.lpur,
"The nudear post.ure and the nudear act.ivities of
hoth countries arc eilkulat.ed to keep nudear
Wl'apons options open, and yet. not 10 develop and
deploy nuclear arms. This adds up to the practice
of nuclear ambiguit.y" (Kapur in DeWitt I!IH7, 2()H).
Nucll~ar proliferation in South Asia is a serio LIS
problem.
I~ven though India and Pakistan Iwve
probably neitlll'r dl'vl'loped nor deployed nllck'ar
aI'senals I~) dale, t1ll'rt' is no guarantl'e Ihat till'
"practice
or nucleill"
amhiguit.y"
will
persist.
indefinitdy. If Wl'apons arl' evenlually deployed, the
potential fill' IIllclear hlllOl:allsl III South Asia is
r.-igt.t.ening.
As a Sllpl'rpOW('r alld OIH' (If I hl' kading nlldl',II"
ShIll'S
has
it
wt'apons
statt's,
IIII'
United
responsibilit.y III address lilt' proillem or Indo-
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Pakistani nu(·lear proliferation. Indeed, as Douglas
Makeig of the U.S. Department of Defense observes:
With the evolution of a quasi-alliance system
that pits India and the Soviet Union against
Pakistan, China, and the United States, and,
a I'egional arms I'ace t.hat could cscalate to thc
nuclcar Icvd, thc rivalry between India and
Pakistan has taken on inllnense significance in
thc global security cnvironmcnt. 01' the I BHUs
(UlH7, 27 I).
But in recent years, U.S. policy has eit Iwr ignored
or cxaccJ'bat.t~d thc problcm. Amcrican policy nccds
to bc adjusted to bcllcr managc thc problcms of'
South Asian proliferation in thc short tcrm, wit.h thc
goal of eliminat.ing thc thrcat of South Asian nuclcar
prolifcration in t hc long tcrrn.
Bd'on' an adjustcd
U.S. policy can bc rationally proposed, it is
neccssary to discuss hoth t.hc prlllifl'rat.ion problem
and past U.S. policy.

THE NUCLEAR CAPAfilLITlES OF
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Part of discussing t.hc pl'Oliferat ion problem
includes an analysis of the nueil'ar eapahilitics of
India and Pakist.an.
As considercd briefly above,
both count.ries probahly have thc capabilit.y t.o
dcvelop and deploy nuclcar wcapolH;.
It is
important t.o descrihe these capabilitics in morc
detail.
Nuclcar capability is a fundion of' foul'
diffcrcnt. fadors: acccss t.o fissilc wcapons material
(cit.lwr plutonium or cnridwd uranium), ability to
producc and dcploy a workabl(~ weapon, a capabilit.y
to deli vcr the weapon (missiles, warplanes, or
suhmarines), and thc political will and power to
exploit t.hesc capabilitics.
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Imlia':.; Nuclear Capabilities
India has signilicant access to lissile weapons
material in its development of an l'xtensive
plutonium-ex lraction capabilily. Currently, there are
four facilities capahle of extrading weapons-grade
plutonium frolll spent uraniulll fuel: one in Trombay,
one in Tarapur, and I wo al Kalpakkam. CUlTently,
these faeililies have the capacity to reprocess ~fifi
met.ric tons of spent fuel per year (Spector I!lH 7,
!)7-H).
More signilicant is thal. since 1!IH:i, India's
Madras I reador at Kalpakkam has provided a
supply of spent fuel free from internalional
regulat.ion.
This means thai India can extract
plutonium from Madras I spent fuel "withoul the
risk of violating any internalional agreement"
(Spector I HH7, Hfi).
Not including plutoniulll from
.~he Madras I reactor, India has prohahly sl~lckpiled
approximat.ely :wn kilograms of weapons grade
plulonium since the inct~ption of its nuclear program
(Spector I H8 7, H5).
India clearly has lhe capallility to produce and
deploy a workable nuclear weapon. In 1!l7 4 India
exploded what il called a "peaceful nuclear device."
The bomb was similar to the U.S. atomic weapon
dropped on Nagasaki in World War II. Since 1!174,
India's Iluclear productioll capabilities seem to have
expanded.
The
Carnegie
EIIlJowment
for
International Peace concluded in I HH4 that India
"could make a thennonueiear device in thn'e years"
(Seth I !)88, 7 I H).
The newest n~port from I he
Canlegie I~ndowmenl estimates that India has I he
availallie materials to producc twpnly to lifty atolll
Lomlls of tilt' typl' lested in I !174 (L~M 17
Novemller I !IHH, :1 ~ l. By I !l!ll, India Illay he ahle
t.o produce ovpr I ut) (Spl'ctor and Stahl I HHH, :I~).
The 1!IH4 Canwgie Endowment n'port pn~dids,
"Expalltll'd reproces:.;ing ('''pability, which is already
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plalllled, alld Ihe illtl'lldlll'lillll IIr hl'avy wall'r p(lwel'
n'l\('ton; ill Ihis dl'{'ade alld Ih(' III'~d. cOllld ~ive Illdia
a warhead poll'lIlial of well 0\'1'1' 1,000 hy Ihe tllrll
of the n'lItmy" (Sl'Ih I !IHH, 71 H).
India has a
broad array of' dt'livery l:apabililies, There are a
varidy of Indian warplanes capable of delivering a
nuclear bomb--the Canherra, Ihe .Jaguar/Ult-I, I.he
Mit: 21, Ihe MiU-2:1 !IN, the Mirage 2000, and the
SlI-7BM_ III all, India POSSl'sses (lvl'r 270 of these
aircraft (Spe('\.()r I!)H 7, !1!I1. t\ It.hough not inlended
for lhe delivery
nudear Wl'apons, India also
possesses a nuclear powered sllbmarine, which it
leased from t.he Soviet Union in .Janllary lUH7. In
addit.ion to the planes and submarine, India
mHlIHIIlt'l'd in March I HHH IIll' dl'vdopment of a
ballistic missile capable of delivering alomic weapons.
Although India claims that t.11l' missile is only for
conventional purpmies, it is \.00 illaccurate to be a
useful conventional weapon,
Bu\. armed "with a
nuclear warhead it would be a serious weapon"
(.k'(,(lflom;st 2() March HIHH, :1 1-2),
Clearly, India has extensive lechnical capabilities
hI develop and deploy nuclear arms, but docs it
have the political will to exploit these capabilities'!
In I mw former Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi
said lhat India will "not hesilale frolll carrying out
nuclear explosions ... or whatever is necessary in t.he
national interest (WI' I" March I !IHO, I). Leonal'd
Spee\or of I he Ca l'Ilegie I';ndowmc nl fill' I ntel'll al iOllal
Peace suggl'sts thai. the reprocl'ssing of unregula\.ed
Madras I spent fuel pl'Ilvidcs "slron~ evidence that,
at a minimum, Rajiv Uantlhi Iindia's current. prime
minist.er! is laking s\.eps t.o enslll'l' \.hat India will
ha ve Lhe option 1.0 Ideploy nucll'al' weapons I rapidly
if circumstances require" (I !IH7, Hli),
<landhi
claimed in .'une I !IHfi \.hal his ('OII1l\.ry could dl'ploy
within "a few wpeks or a f('w mOlllhs (,../lIS/SA fi
.June I !IHfi, I'~ I).
011 August H, I ~)Hfi the ruling
Congress (I) party joinl'd thl' right-wing opposit.ioll

or

21

calling fot' a finn response 10 Pakislan's nuclear
program (f.'IUS/SA H August IUHfi, 1':2).
K.
Subrahmanyam, director of the Indian Institute 1'0 ..
Defence Studies and Analyses, a .. gued in 1HH7 that
a nudea .. Pakistan is inevitable, and so India should
move ahead with its own nuclea.. arsenal (Seth
I U88, 720).
Although the pressu .. e to develop a
nlldeat' deterrent is strong, it has not yet had a
decisive eflccl on Indian nudear policy.
In fael,
S. P. Scl.h, directo.. of t.he Stratcgic Planning,
Research, Information & Consult.ancy Service in
Auslralia, reminds that "it would be wrong to
assume that the nuclear hawks rule the roost in
India ... India's ant.i~nudear lobby is fairly strong anJ
a .. ticulate" (I HHH, 721).
While the ..e is significanl politjeal will 10 maintain
a credible nuclea.. optioll in India, the full
exploitation of India's nudear capability t.hrough
deployment will probably be forcstalled, ba .... ing
significant changes in the South Asian security
environment. Probably I he tTlost signilit~ant inl1uence
(In this security ellvironment for India is Pakistan's
nudeat' ambiticlIls.

III

Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilities
Pakistan's access to fissile wt·;tpon's material has
been m()l'e problematic. Bccause France te .. minated
assistance in the construction of the Chashma
reprocessing plant in 1!J78, Pakistan has generally
pursued a much Illore I:oslly uranium cnrichmcnt
pl"ocess
to
acquire
weapons-graJe
material.
FlirlhennH ..e, a de 1(/1"/0
inte .. national nudea ..
tedlllology embargo has filn'pd Pakistan to PIll"SlW
unllliuIH en .. ichment technology covt· .. lly. In the past
decade Pakistan has been able t.o produce a
wo .. kable tm .. ichllwnt facility at I(ahula, East. of
Islamabad (Spl·t" to.. 1!lH7, 10 I).
U.S. inll·lligl'lH"e
SIllIl"n'S daim Ihal Ilw I<ahllia facility "has l'llridwd
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uranium 10 !)O%, suit ahle for I atOlnic\ weapons,"
Theru have also been reports of a second enrichment.
plant. under consiruct.ion al (loll''' (l'SM 14 Decemher
\B87, 7),
Overall, some e!;timates claim lhal t.he
Kahuta facility could produce a maximum of furt.ylive kilograms of weapons grade uranium a year
(C.-anslun I !)84, S 7!)O I),
Even though most ohservers believe t.hat. Pakistan
has produced wcaptlIls-gl'adc uranium, some experls
are skeptical. 1.1\, llsmani, tllP fonner chairman of
Pakistan's Atomic Energy COllllllh;sion, explains lhe
basis for this skeplicism:
It takes 7,000 cenlrifuges to wOI'k day and
night lill' one yeai' at velocity of :l~,()()() mph
t.o produce \0 kg, of u.'anium- ~;15 of !Hl, wy"
purit.y, required fill' pl'Otiueing one Hil"Oshimat.ype bomb, Even in Europe t.hey have only
heen ahle t.o achieve enrichment of 2,7%".
One day somehody is going to call OUl' bluff
(Selh I B88, 715),

Olher ex pert.s concur.
Dr. Haja Ramanna, (()I'mer
chairman of India's At.omic Energy Commission, does
not "t.hink Pakistan's exist.ing nuclear infrast.rucllll'c
qualifies it 10 make an atmn hmoh."
Dr. B,N.
Selima, Hamann,,'s pl'l'de~'essor, expressed a similar
vicw in I H8~ (Selh I !)88, 715),
Nevert.heless, even if Pakistan has failed t.o
produce weapons-grade uranium, lhey may have
recent.ly developed a pluloniulll extraction capahilily.
In
I !tHO
Pakistan started conslrudion' of a
clandestinc reprocessing facility al. Rawalpindi near
t.he Pak islan I nst ilul.t.' of SCil~IH'I~ and Technology,
If the facililY is oppralional, it. could be producing
apJll'Oximalely lilll!cn kilograms of weaJlolH;-grade
plut.oniulII a year (SI'III I !)8H, 7 I:\),
Because I'akistan has III'VI'I' I'(lIIdudcd a Illldl'ar
ksl, il is 1I0t 1~lltirply CI'rtaill I.hal it is ahle 10 use

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
its weapons-grade uralliulIl and plutonium in the
PI'otiuctioll of a nuclear weapon.
Ilowever, from
1HH2 to 1HH4 anonyrnow; sources were quoted in the
III'ess claiming that China had provided Pakistan
with nuclear design information, thus allowing
Pakistan to develop a workable atomic weapon
without testillg (WP 2H Jt'euruary InH~l, t; U.S.
Congress IHHH, 17). But China has denied aiding
the Pakistani atomic weapons program.
Vice
Premier Li Peng said in 1UHf) that nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan "is and will be conducted
for peaceful purpmws only and not for not-peacpful
()tll'poses" (Porter in DeWitt. 1!lH7, 141). Meanwhile,
a U.S. intelligence report in July 1!IH5 indicated that
Pakistan had successfully tested a triggering device
necessary to the production of a workable atomic
weapon (Spector 1!lH7, I ()7).
Pakistani leaders Sl~l'm to confirm thesc rcports.
Dr. A.Q, Khan, thp head of Pakistan's IlllCleal'
program, was quotcd in the March I, 1!IH7
ObsCI'IIt!r (London): "What the CIA has been saying
about our possessing the homb is correct and so is
the spenliation of so III I' foreign newspapers."
Dr.
Khan and the Pakistani government later dellied his
statement WI';/O;U I~ Marl'll I!lH7, a·i), But in the
same month, fonner Pakistani President Zia ul-Ilaq
told Timl!, "You can virtually write today that
Pakistan call huild a homb wlll'lIcvl'r it wishes.
W hat is difficult about a bomh'!
Onn' YOll have
acquired the tcchnology, which Pakistan has, you
can do whatever you likc" (:Itl March 1!IH7, 42).
But. these st.atl'llll'llts may simply he polit ieal
pm;t.uring, not. rcality. Thus, a dcgrec of uncertainty
still Slll'l'Ollllds Pakistani nudear l:apahility.
Notwit.hstanding t his uncertainty, Spel'lol' COlH'tll'S
with most otlll'r l'xl)!'rts that Pakistan "either
posscs~;t>s
all
of till' (~OlllpOlwnts
nceded
to
manufacture lUll' or HI'v!'l'al atom hOlllhs 01' dse
remains just short of I his goal" (SpI'dor I mn, 1111).
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Ami lhe I BHH Cal'lll'gie EndowllH'nt n·port. est.imat.es
lhat Pakistan eUlTcntiy posscsses t.he "t'sscntials lill'
two to four atom it' 1.ombs" (CSI\t 17 Novl'mber
I !)8H, :12). Pakist.an may he ahle to produce fift.een
weapons by I U!) I (Spector and St.ahl I VHH, :l~).
And according t.o a I !IH4 Cenl." for Sl.rategic and
International Studies report, Pakisl,;\Il's presenl
estimated IIranillm elll'ieJunent capahility could yield
appl'Oximateiy t.hirty-six warheads hy ~()()n (Seth
I !lHH, 714),
lInlike India's ,.datively diverse capahilities,
Pakistan's (,IIITent delivery capabilities am limited 1.0
warplanes. U.S.-supplied F-llis alld FH·nch-supplied
Mirage fiPA:ls can bolh sUl'l'essflllly calTY nudeal'
bomLs.
Also, Pakistan's Miragt' :mps and Q-fiAs
can be modilied lo calTY Iludcar weapons (Spt'do)'
1!)H7,

I~:n.

lJ ntil rccent Iy, till' polit kill will of Pakistan t.o
exploit its nllclear capahililies has bCl'n rather
uncerlain. Pakist.an refraim·d from signilicant public
discussions concel'l1ing its nudear intentions unt.il late
I !lHf>.
Al a press-sponsored I'OlInd-tahlL' discussion
in Novemher I UHf> Mohammed Ilanif Hanay, leader
of Pakistan's opposition Mllsawat Party, stated,
"India's expansionism will make it attack liS soonm'
01' later.
The only way we l:an pl'Ot.ed ollnmlves
is by developing nuclear weapons" (Hpedo,. IH87,
I ()7).
The following monlh Tufail Mohammad,
chief of Pakistan's fundamentalist .Jamaat.-i-Islami
Pal'ty, called for lhe (ll'Odlidion of nllclear weapons
(Spedor IBR7, IOH).
And III 1!IHli Dr. Khan
puhlished a paper t.hat spoke favorahly of a
Pakistani nudear detelTenl, (Khan I !IHH, 4 2()-4 ~).
This is especially signiJicant. given Dr. Khan's
posilion as lite head or Pakistan's nudear pmgram.
Despile these st.atenll'nts, t.he late Primp Minist.er
,'unejo and the late Presidelll Zia lIl-ltaq both
claimed t.hal Pakisl.all did 1I0t illtelld to deploy
nudear weapolls (\VI' IX .'uly 1!1H1i, I).

N UCLI~A I{ PROI ,I FII:I{A'I'ION
But. ,'unejo and Zia were both killed III an
airplane explosion in August I !JHH. Since lhen, the
cent.er of polit.ical power in Pakistan has bel'n
obscured, complicating the analysis of Pakistani
nuclear intentions.
Following the assassination,
Ghulam Isha" Khan was appointed acting president.
The seventy·three year old leader was once Zia's
finance minister and later tile (~hainnan of t.he
Pakistani Sl'nat.e.
lie has IlI'en involved in
Pakist.ani polilies for t.wl'nly yean; (J.;("onom;sl 20
Augusl I HRR, '27). Ishaq Khan I.welllS to be rat.her
powerful and expl'rienl'ed.
It. is not clear how he
views the nuclear deployment issue, but. his ties
. wit.h Zia may indicate his prefel"l~nce for a conlinued
policy of ambiguity.
Following general elections in November, Ishaq
Khan appointed Benazir Bhullo to be Pakistan's new
Prime Minister on December .I, I ~18R.
Bhullo's
nuclear int.cntions arc equally unclear. lIer faUll'r,
Zulkifar Ali IlhuUo, initialed Pakistan's nuclear
weapons progt·am in the early I H7()s. Ill' was laler
execut.ed by t.he Zia regime, but. Bhutto seemed to
abandon her father's polit.ical legacy following Zia's
death (CSM 18 Novembet· 1BHH, :11;).
This may
indicate t.hat she docs not necessarily intend to
fm·t.her exlend her father's agenda, which included
a
slrong
commitmenl
to
lIuclear
weapons
development. Furthermore, she staled in I !lR() lhat
Pakistan's nuclear research program is infeasible and
would have to be rl'assesscd (Spedor 1!IH7, 110).
Lat.er the satTle year she t.old UIl' I",{illll /<;xp,-/,s.o;
t.hat. if she was dl'(·ted, she would ahandon the
policy of· lIuclear ambiguit.y, seU ling all doubts
concerning t.he potent ial military lISl' of Pakist.an's
nudear program (FillS/SA 1·1 Aligust I !Il'Hi, 1-'2).
This may indicate her willingn('ss t.o suhmit.
Pakist.an's nudea .. facilities to IAJo:I\ reglilation.
Even t.hough till' Pakistani political l'nvironllwnt
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has pl'Ohably stahilized since BhllUo's appointment.,
there IS sl ill a st mng polpnl ial for instabilit.y.
Inside her Pakistani People's Parly (1'1'1') Bhutlo is
confnlllied with a left-wing eoalition thut is "antiAmerican, anti-rich, and anli-arIllY" (l';cilllo/1list '27
August I nss, '2:n. With signilicant pressures from
the military t.o maintain good n'lations with the U.S.
and their own positions of pOWl'r, it will be diflicult
f(U" Bhutto to satisfy the far left's agenda.
At the
same time her authority is challl·ngl'd by the rightwing Islamic Democratic Alliance, who have vowed
to challenge her appointment in the Pakistani courts
(Ecoflomist '2() November H)88, :1'2).
If Bhutto is
unable to overcome these challenges, signilicant
instability is not in(:onceivable as a broad array of
interests remain unsatislil'd.
This instability may
increase the role of the military in Pakistani political
decisions. While lhe cu ....ent. military chief, Aslam
Beg, is said "to be without political ambitions,"
observers suggest that "enough blood on the streets
would bring the army in" (I":"oflo/1li8t 27 August
I H88, 2:1). Surprisingly, a milit ary takeover may
decrease the political will of Pakistan 10 exploit its
nuclear capabilities.
Stephen Cohen of Berkeley
University in his· I H84 study of the Pakistani
military has concluded that nudear weapons are not
generally attractive 1.0 Pakj~tan's military leadership
(Cohen I !)S4, laa-()().
The nuclear capabilities of both India and
Pakistan
arc
cause
'ill"
serious
concern.
Nevertlwless, as previously discussed both nations
am currently pursuing a policy of nuclear ambiguity
where they remain at the nm:lear threshold without
actually deploying nucleal" weapons. But it is clear
that deployment cannot be forestalled indelinilely.
Spector argues that "evcn if cal'll side refrains frum
testing or asscmhling bOlllhs, they will continue to
build st.ocks of plutonium lor uranium I, and internal
presslIre will grow with eaeh new spat. 1.0 Illove
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fm·ward with delivery systems" (CSM 14 December
HHn, 7).
If deployment occurs, a nuclear South
Asia will pose several serious problems. But even
without deployment, there is still cause for concern.

THE IMPACT OF INDO-PAKISTANI
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
There are basically three different effects of
nuclear proliferation in South Asia: incrcased
instability in lhe Indo-Pakistani rivalry, increased
.·isk of nuclear pmliferation beyond the region, and
an increased pressure on lhe woddwide nuclear nonproliferation regiml!.
Impact

Oil

lhe

Indo-Pakistani Rivalry

Nuclear proponents in Pakistan and India both
argue that nuclear deployment would enhance
military deterrence in South Asia, thus reducing the
risk of war.
Suhrahmanyam, an Indian defense
expert, a.·gues, "II istory shows that the development
of nuclear weapons capabilit.y among nations having
an adversarial rehltionship has led to stability" (Seth
1988, 720). S. M. Zafar, secretary of former Prime
Minister .Junejo, added that. the development of
nuclear weapons will "stop all danger of war in this
region just as the nudear strength of the two
superpowe.·s has eliminated the danger of war
between them since Wodll War II" (Spector 1!l87,
t (7). But this historical argument for dl'tl"Tlmn' is
invalid for several reasons.
Initially, them is a strategic pl"Ollll·m.
For
nlldear detc .... encc to work, hoth sidt's Illllst POSSl'SS
a credihle retaliatory capahility.
If this cap,lhilily
pxists, neillwr lIatilltl wants to lallnch IIIldea ..
weapons preelllpti vPly hccallst' then' is liu II' prospl't"I
of avoiding IIIld!!ar dl'slnlctillll fl"OlII a retaliatory
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strike. This condition is what Wl'stern strategists
call MAD (M ut lIally Asslln'if Ill'st ruction). Hidwn'
lIaass of lIarvard University has ex,Plaim'd the
absence of MA D in t he Indo· Pakist.ani rivalry:
"A It.hough both India and Pakist.an pOssess a nlllnb~~r
of advanced airnaft, capable of t.raveling co'nsiderable
range, and despite India's impressive strides in
developing a space program, each country is far
away fi'om possessing a stable retaliatm'y ('apabilit.y"
(llaass I UHH, 115).
The lack of MAD in South
Asia is primarily due to the small size of the
potential nuclear arsenals and the inability rOl' eilllCl'
side 1.0 quickly del.ecl a preemptive strike.
In a
crisis situation t.his strat.egic vulnerability would
inCl'ease bot.h Indian and Pakistani incent.ives to
preemptively launch theil' nudear arms because
delaying a launch would risk uUer dest.rUclion
without. any prospect. for retaliation.
But even if MAD (:ould be est.ahlished in Sout.h
Asia, t.here are st.iII t.he problems of accident.al
launch and crisis miscalculation t.hat the superpowel's
conl'ront in their nuclear rivalry. I·'ew would argue
that spreading t.hese problems t.o South Asia would
he desirable, But beyond these l'OImnon problems,
t.he nature of t.he Indo·Pakistani rivalry significantly
dilutes the utility of nudear weapons in South Asia.
«'il'st, the stakes in a typical I ndo· Pakistani conflict.
are much higher than in a typical superpower
eonflicl--naLional survival versus a particular regional
CIIIH.:ern.
India or Pakist.an might risk nudear
confrontat.ion to maint.ain tlll'ir nat ional int.egrit.y.
If the same interest.s Wl'n~ threat.encd in a
superpOWl'r conllict., the Sovil'l. Union or the United
Stat.es might. he expecll'd to at'! similarly.
Second, India and Pakistan also sharp a ('ommon
honler. Consl'qlll·nt.ly, "limited ('onfl'Ont.ations or low·
level dashes could spill over qui('kly into vital
national lelTil.ory and threaten nit,iral national
interests, perhaps even survival (DUlin I !'H~, 70).

NUCLI~AR
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The pressure to usc nuclear weapons would be great
in this sit.uation as Michael Brenner of t.he
U niversit.y
of
l'iUsLu..,~h
ex plains:
"I n
the
atmosphere of a high stakes confrontat.ion where
ideology may he the driving force and where the
nuclear Lalance is so easily tipped, there is a fair
chance that t.he psychological balance will tilt
towards usc of nuclear weapons" (Brenner in DeWitt
IHS7, fiB).
"~inally, India and Pakistan share a legacy of
direct conflict. They have filught three major wars
since 1!)4 7. This legacy makes small nises more
dillicult. to diffuse. And even though a major war
has not. been filUght. since I !J7I, India and Pakistan
have not left the pot.ential fill' armcd conflict behind
them.
In .January I !l87 the two nations came
precariously close t~1 rekindling wal'.
lIaass
chronicles this crisis:
A I"l'ecnt nisis OCCUlTed in l~ady I !I87, when
a large Indian military l'xl'lTist' ("Operation
Brass Tacks") in t.he bonk'r st at.l' of H~~iast.han
prompted a Pakist.ani mobilizat.ion. India llIay
have sought. to intimidate Pakistan fi,.. any
number of reasons--t.o rClllind Islamabad of
I ndia's regional primacy, t.o Jll'rSlHldl' Pakist.an
t.o terminate alleged support fill' Sikh t.clTorists,
or simply to provide a foreign dist.raction for
domest.ic polit.ical purposes. What is ecrtain,
t.hough, is how event.s neady slipped out. of
control, and a fourt.h South Asian war was
narrowly avoided hy last minute diplomacy in
a mu~uul st.and-down (lluass I!I88, 112).
I ndia and Pakistan dashed again in lall' September
"at. positions oVl'dooking four mountain passes lin
Northern Kashmir I.
OLsl'rvl'rs ("alll'd it "the
higgl'st encOllllter sinl"l~ intermittent dasill's bl'gan in
ImH" W/·;/·;U 80etober t!I87, Itll. II Illay he only
II
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a maUer of time be/ill'c o/w of tlwse incidents
develops inlo an a/l-olli. wal".
If nuclear weapons
an' available, a IHldear '1OIoeall:;1 in SOlllh A:;ia is
very possible.
Beyond traditional Indo- Pakist.ani rivalries, the
very pursuit. of nuclear capaLilities might lead to
wal".
As nudear development proceeds, the two
nations might be tempted t.o preemptively strike the
other's IIlH:/ear racilities a:; Israel did in I BH I
against Iraq.
Some reports claim that Israd has
approached India on three separate ol·casions t.o offer
assistance in a joint att.ack against Pakistan's
nudear fadlit it's (Hhat ia I !IHH, ltHi).
In late
Seplembel o I !IH5 rlllllors surfaced in Pakistan
indic'lting that a preemptive strike had been
considered by tilL' Indian military during the
administration of Indira (;handi.
However, the
Indian government denied lhese rumors WillS/SA ti
November I BH5, I~ I). In a I !IH4 interview wit.h the
Jllterllutiollul Hemlli Tribulle, former
Pakistani
Foreign Minist.er Sahabzadeh Yaqub Khan warned
t.hat Islamabad "would have no alternative but to
relaliale" if India at.tacked it.s nuclear facilities.
Zalamay M. Khalizad of lhe Institute of War and
Peace at Columbia University daimed that "an
at.lack of this kind muld set the stage lill" a larger
Indo-Pakislani war" (Khalizad in eoldblat IHH5a,
1 :~8).
A 1!)S5 verbal agreement between lhe two
nations prohibiting preemptive strike against nudear
facilities might prevent this scenario. lIowever, the
agreement has not. yel been lill'maliwd, so its
usefulness is limit.ed (Makeig I!IS7, 2!H). Cleady,
the risk of war is high and probably increasing In
South Asia.
If India and l'aki:;l.an again go to war, lIlt.-n- is
no guarantee that a nudear conflict. can be avoided.
Probably most rright('lIing is tlH~ potential for a
broader lIuc/ear war ill volvillg IIH~ Hllperpowprso
lIaass suggests that "allY IHIl:lear cOllllict. ill South
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Asia would bring not just Jevastation to the region
but would raise the danger of a bl'Oader eonflid
involving lhe United States, the Soviet Union, and
China" (llaass 1miH, 1 iii).
Impad on

Extra-Regional

Pl'Oliferation
Another problem with Indo-Paki~tani nuclear
proliferation is the potential spread of' selHiltlve
nuclear technology to other Third World nations. In
general, an inneasing number of l'llwrgent nuclear
material or technology suppliers increases motives
fm· countries pursuing nuclear capabilities to go
ahead with weapons development. Stanley Ing of
the Canadian Department of National Defense
explains this general phenomenon:
Once a country has dedded to develop a
nucleaJ· weapons programme, the increased
number of exporters becomes an important
factor.
The availability of nudear
technology and Ii~sile materials means that a
country no longer has t.o spend years
developing a nuclear t.echnological infrast.ructure
heftll·e proceeding wi lh a nuclear weapons
programme.
Becuuse t he emergent
suppl,ers do not. export complete power
reactors, and bl'cause the nudear components
they do export are easier to obtain, certain
threshold countries may he persuaded to
establi-sh facilities dedicah·d solely tH nuclear
weapons developllwnL
Such a route could
incur political cost.s, but this, too, may be
acceptable in view of t.he financial savings and
the perceived strat.egic import.ance of quickly
acquiring nuclear capability (lng in DeWitt.
1!IH7, 12'l-H).
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This analysis may pSlweially apply t~1 the
potential henefil'iaries of Pakistani a 1111 Indian nuclear
experience. I·'ormcr Prcsidlmt Zia dedared in 1!lHH,
"Il is (Pakistan'sl right to obtain Inudcal'l
technology. And whcn we aequirc this technology,
the enti,"e Islamic world will possess it 'with us"
WillS/SA H' March I HHfi, ••' I), But Sl,th argucs
t.hat these t.ypes or stalemcnts fmm Pakistani
officials are probably symbolic:
Whether or not Pakistan will make available
its 'bomb' 01' nuclear technology tH other
Islamic countrics is aq~uable, and even if
I~akist.an were willing to share the bomb, there
are pradical probll'ms in terms of Ipoliticall
divisions in the Islamic world in which
Islamabad docs not want to get involved (Seth
1!lHH, 71 (i).
While Sclh's ohservation Illay he valid, Zia's
statelllenl neverlheless secms to rit wcll with
Pakistan's I URn nudear cooperation a~rccmcnts wit.h
Egypt and Iraq WHiSIN A n December 1BHn, D4).
India could also be contributing tA) the fUt,ther
sp,'ead of nudear wcapons in the Middle ~asl. Ing
has documented India's status as an emcrgent
nuclear supplier:
India is emerging as a potentially major
nucleat' supplicr.
As thc first Third World
counlry to invcsl signiricant.ly in nuclear
energy, I ndia is able to convcrt ils experiencc
in t.his area into an cxportablc commodity . .
I ndia has gonc on to conclude nudl'ar
agreements wilh some Third World wlllltries.
Among thcse arc countrics which arc in the
midsl of a war, or arc located in a region of
somc instability,
TIll'HC include Iraq, Syria,
and Lihya (lng in DeWitt. 1!IH7, I~II-I),
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<1iven the increasing evidence of Israeli nuclear
capahilities, the nudear ambitions of these potential
Middle I';astern Leneficiaril's arc probably not entirely
benign,
If (.hesl' nations were to oblain nuclear
weapons capabilities, the risk of renewed Arab-Israeli
conflict would inerease drastically, II' any of these
nations were to deploy nuclear weapons, the result
could be catastrophic given tlw volatill' nature of the
Amb-Israeli ('(Inflict,
But the potential for the
spread of nuclear capahili tics frolll South Asia Illay
extend beyond the MidJle (o;asl.
Impact on the Overall
Non-Proliferation

Regime

Both India and Pakistan are non-signalories to
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Tl'eaty (NPT), This
treaty established the first formal emnt to regulate
the spread of nuclear technology by ereating the
Inlernational Atomic Energy Agency (I A I'; A) to
enfm'ce the treaty's stipulations, . Other efl{lI·ts exist
to I'egulale the spread of nuclear technology,
including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSU), The
NSG has I()rmulated nuclear export guidelincs
adopted by the fifteen major nuclear supplier
countries in I ~n 7 (Council Oil Foreign Heinl ions
H)H6, fH), While other near-nudear ('ollnll'il's stich
as ISI'acl and Sout.h Africa wntributc, India's and
Pakistan's non I'l'coglll I Ion 01' the Nt''!' :lnJ its
potential disregard 01' the NSU conlribute to the
erosion of both nonpl'Olifi.~l':ll.ion Illl'aSUI'I'S,
Initially, their nonl't'('ognil ion (as well as other
nations' n'onrecognilion) of the NPT and continued
plll'suit
of weapons
capabilities
(:ould
(,:lUSl'
frustl'ation alllong ('omplying naliolls,
If thest'
conditions pl'rsist, I'nlsll'aled N PT nal ions Illay
eVl'lltually resign (1\1,,111'1' in I h' W ill I !IH 7, !1:I .. j"
I"dia's a"d Pakistan's slatus a~ ellll'l'gl'nl. suppliers
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Ing suggest.s:

I t is st.ill too early to predict whether t.he
increased volume of nudear transfers that is
likely to I'ellwin 'heyond I A EA inspection will
bring into question the legitimacy of the
NP'l'/IAEA regime. Ilowever, one may begin
to wonder about the I'c!evance of a regime
that is being partly circulllvented by emergent
suppliers which do not necessarily share the
non-proliferation perspectives (~ontained within
Uw current regime (lng in DeWitt. IHH7, 124).
I I' the N PT were significantly eroded, most would
agl'ee that the resulting global security environment
would be less stable.
India's and Pakistan's sl alus as emergent.
Ing again
suppliers also undermines the NS(~.
explains:
Further increase III the market share of
emergent suppliers abo could have adverse
effecls on the policil's and unity of the NSG.
Co-ordinat.ion of policies within Ihe NSG is
already dil'ficult, and the Iwed 10 be more
competitive as a result. or more supplier
alternat.ives could lead to a looser interpretation
or suppliers' guidelines (I !IH 7, 12[;).
At the mlillmum, Ing argut's that needed
improvements of NS(l gui.lelincs l'Iluld be post.poned
or ahandoned (IHH7, 125).
(liven t.heHe prohlclIIH, it HCCIllH deal' that nudear
proliferation in South AHia iH a significant problem.
What has the Unitcd States Jone to address the
problem?
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NON-PROLIFERATION
POLICIES IN SOUTI-I ASIA
Overall, u.s. policy has L)Cen ineffective in
confronting the problem of South Asian proliferation.
At limes it has exacerbated the problem.
The
legacy of U.S. non-proliferation policy in South Asia
can be analyzed in two different periods: prc- I !17B
pulicies and posl- I !17H policies.
Pre- I !I7B Policics
The IImblem of South Asian nudear proliferation
pmhably shu"ted in I !I71 when India testt·d a
nudear device.
lIaass dt'scril.ws the U.S. response
lo this lest as "perfune!.ory."
And although U.S.
naval presence in the Indian Ocean modestly
expanded, most lJnited Stales allention was focused
on othel" problems, inl"iuding "lhe final I hmes of war
in Vietnam, ddl'nte in I'~uropl', volatile conditions
in t.he Middle East, and the impact of the oil price
hike" (tJaass I !lHH, lOH).
IIowever, even if lhe
United States had vigorously condemned the nudear
teHt in I !I74, the influl'lwc OIl Indian policy prolJaLly
would have been minOI' hCt'ause of the Nixon
administ.ration's display of naval force during t.he
I !)71 Indo-Pakist.ani war. While the display was t.oo
insignificant to satisfy Pakistan, it was "enough to
t~onfinn American hostility fill" Indians" (II aass I !ISH,
I UH).
The end rcsult" was a decreased ability to
influence either India or Pakistan on any issue,
including lhe pursuit. of nudear weapons.
Following the Indian nudear test, Pakistan Legan
sl'l~king repr()(~essing technology from France.
In
I !I7H President Uerald Ford's nlllcern over Pakistan's
lHae/eal" intentions prompted him to send Secretary
of State IIenry I<issinger to Islamabad.
Lat~~r,
Secret.ary Kissinger Wl'nt to Paris to convince tlte
FI"cnclt to suspend n~pro('('ssing technology t ransfl'rs
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to Pakh;tan. In I B77 the French complied with the
United State's re'lul'st.
To furilll'r unders('ore its
concern, till' Ford administ rat ion tlll'n Cllt o'l
economic and military aid tn Pakistan (Spl'c\.or I !IH.I,
74-HIL
After Pakistan lost 'HTI'SS til reprocessing
technology, it started punilling uraniulTl cllI"ichment
tcchnology.
In I !17H the Carter administration
puhlicly expressed conn'rn OVl'r Pakistan's pursuit of
enriched uraniullJ.
Assist'''lt Secretary of SLaLe
Thomas Pkkering testified bel'orl' a Senate committee
that Pakistan's enrichment program was not
consistent with its nuclear l'nergy needs.
lie
condudl'd, "We are cOIll'l'l'Iwd, therefore, t.hat the
Pakiutani program is not peaceful but related to an
effort to develop a nudear-cx plosive capability" (U.S.
Congress I !l7!1, J (). The administration thcreafter'
again suspended military an!' eeO/wmie aid to
Pakist.an
in
compliance
with
the
Syminghlll
Amendment of the I H7H Nudear Non-prolifcration
Act.
It is dil'licult, to assess the impact of U.S. policy
on Pakistan's nuclear ambitions during this period.
The aid sllspensions may have had lUI dl'ed. After
the Ford administ.ration's aid sanctions and France's
suspension
of technical
aid
for
reprocessing
technologies, Pakistlln simply refocused it.s efforts
into enrichment t{~chnologies. Pakistani political will
to pursue nuclear capability also seemed to remain
strong as Prime Ministcr Ali Bhutto said Pakistan
would "eat. grass" if necessary til eCJual India's
nuclear capabilit.y (llaass I !IHH, IOH-H).
But on
Christ.mas Day I !17!1 the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan and the United States ahandllned ils
hard lirw position against I'l'Olif!'ration in South Asia.
As a result, thl' aid S:IIl!'tiolls approach was
ahandoned, making it unclear if' till' policy could
havc
anl~d('d
Pakistani
d!'('isioll-making given
sufficient t.ime,
The Afghan invasion marked a
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I'ost- 1!17!) Policies
Ii'ollowing the Afghan invasion, the Carler
administration moved IH restore aid to Pakistan.
The administration's ofler of $400 millioll was
rejected by Zia, "suggesting that the United States
had t.o offer much more 10 persuade him to provoke
Moscow or rethink his nuclear weapons commitment."
(Baass I USS, IOn). Carter was later replaced by
Reagan, who then sweetened the offer. In I H81 the
Reagan administration extended a six-year $:1. 2
billion aid package in return for Pakistan's
cooperation in U.S. security policy in Southwest. Asia
and the PeI'sian nulf.
Pakistan was also granted
a
six-year
exemption
from
t.he
Symington
Amendment (Spector 1087, 1(4).
But the situation in Afghanistan coupll'd wil h
Pakistan's nuclear ambitions prest'nted the Unit.ed
Stutes with a policy dilemma.
Ilow could Soviet
ex pansionism be checked without. abandoning nonproliferation'!
Ilaass
explains
I he
Heagan
administnltion's resolution of Ihis dilemma:
The adminisl ralion Iwlievcd Ihal denying aid
to gain access to all nuclear facilitil's would
pmve futile.
Moreover, the administration
argued that. a slrong scnnity relationship with
the United Slates would provide Pakistan with
an alt.ernative ml'ans of gaining security while
the United States, as tlw prindpal source of
conventional weaponry, would gain leverage in
the pmcess. . . But nuclear nOll-proliferation
t:ompded with removing the Soviets from
Afghanistan. And of Ihe Iwo, the laUer was
more import.ant to Ihe Ih'agan administration
(llaass I !)HH, IO!)).
Even t hough less imporl ani, IlOn-proliferal ion
dl(II'ls did not cease l'ntirely.
III .June I !IH,I U.S.
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officials heeame aware t.hat Pakist.an was continuing
to pursue nudear capabilities, which included work
on weapons design and covert 'l('quisit.ion of nudear
mat.erials from abroad. However, resisting presslll-e
from Congress, Reagan aides insist.ed that the
renewal of aid sandions was impossible given the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan ("Unit.ed St.at.es
Set~urity Interest.s in South Asia" 1!tH4).
I,ater t.he
same mont.h, three Pakistani nat ionals were indict.ed
fo,· t.rying to smuggle lilly high-speed nuclear
weapons swit.dll's known as hytOlIS.
While lhe
Pakist.ani govenllnent denied any l·omplicit,y in the
affair, it was later shown t.hal. till' kryt.ons were
ordered by S. A. Bull, direcl~)r of supply and
procurement for the Pakistani Atomic Energy
Commission (N\"/' 25 February I !tH5, I).
In
response to rumors t.hat China was aiding Pakistan's
nuclear program by offering weapon designs, t.he
Reagan administrat.ion postponed for almost a year
approval of a Sino-U.S. nuclear trade pad (N\"I' 22
June HtR4, I). And in Seplcmber Reagan wrote a
letter urging President Zia t.o abandon the pursuit
of weapons capability.
The lett.er suggested that
U.S. aid would be t.erminated if weapons grade
uranium was produced (WS,/ 25 Odober I B84, I).
Foreign Minister Khan and President Zia both
seemed willing to comply with the Reagan let.ll~I-'s
stipulations.
Khan assured Reagan of this
personally in a mid-November visit to Washington.
And when Zia announced in early I UHf) that
enriched uranium had been produced at Kahut.a, he
was careful t.o stipulate t.hat it was not weaponsgrade (Spect.or I BH 7, 10(;).
Meanwhile, Congress began ilHlislillg that more
efforts be llIade tH dissuade Pakistall from pursuing
weapons capabilit.y. III .July I !)Hfi COlIgrl'ss allll'ntled
the aid package, requiring Ihe Presidcnl to (~crtify
that Pakist.an did 1101. pOSSI~SS a lIuclear dt~vin~ hdiH'e
funds could hI! dishursl'd (SpI'clor I !IH'l, 101i). But.
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Pakistan seemed 10 be undaunted.
As described
above, in the same IlHlnth it was reported that
Pakistan had tested a lIuclear trigger.
In August
Pakistan reportedly attempted to buy flash X-ray
cameras from the Hewlett- Packard company for use
in non-explosive nudear lests. The sale, however,
was blocked by the U.S. government (Spector IH87,
1(7).
Congress again tried to act in the summer
of 1~)85 by passing the Solarz Amendment, which
would terminate Pakistani aid if its covert ell"ol·ts
were not ceased.
But the Reagan administration
exercised discretion granted in another amendment,
choosing not to apply the Solarz measure to Ihe
case of Pakistan (Specl~lr IHH7, 115).
Instead of applying the Solarz Amendment, the
administration dispatched Undersecretary of St.ate for
Political Allairs Michael Armacost and National
Security Council stall member Donald Fort ier IH
South Asia.
Thei.· mission was hI
slall
pmlilcration by encouraging an Indo-Pakistani
regional initiat.ive.
But India ~purned this effort,
"claiming that Washington was attempting to avoid
its responsibilities for halting the Pakistani nudear
pl"()gram" (Spet"t.or I BH7, 7H).
Today, the United Stalt!s seems to have
abandoned these types of initiatives, depending on
t.he aid incentives established in I ~)R I instead.
In
the spring of I BHti another aid package was
negotiated with Pakistan on even more generous
terms: $'L02 billion over six years to begin in
October IDR7. A 1111 ill October IDHti Ihe presidcnl
certilied the dishursl'llll'nl. of till' lasl installllwni of
aid from the I !IH I agrct'ment.. This seems 10 have
been dOlw in spite of inldligence reports lhal
Pakistan had pnlllut"l'd weapons-grade uraniulll (WI'
4 November I !IHti, I).
As t.he end of lilt' I !18 I aid package approadll'd,
Ihe non-prolilcrat.ion debate was again renewed on
Capitol Hill in \ate 1!IH7. And on .July 10, IDS7,
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a Canadian eit izen of Pakistani origin was arrested
in Philadelphia for attempting to purchase and
export twenty-five tons or maraging stcel used in
uranium enrichment processes.
This seemed to
alienate some members or Congress (llaass U)88,
I 14).
Ncvcrthcless, a new aid package was
eventually approvcd by Congn'ss ill Dpcembel".
Before the aid was approvcd, Congn'ss passed two
nonbinding I'esolutions calling fill' Pakistan 10 submit
it.s nuclear facifities 10 international regulation in
order 10 qualWy fiJI' fmUler linited Slatl's aid.
Thesc resolutions were never madl' law, howevel',
and so t hey had no effect on lJ .S. policy. I n the
end, Congl'ess approved the aid as Ill'gotialed by the
administration in I m~H. The Syminghm Anllmdment
was once again waived fill' two and a half years,
while a new stipulat.ion was added providing fiJI' the
automalil' resl"ission or till' waivcr should India
accept international regulation or its nuclear pl'Ogralll
(lluass I !)88, I I :1).
And till' stipulat ion requiring
presidential wrtificalion for aid dishursl'ments was
abandoned WI';/·;U 24 Dl'celllber I !)H 7, 21).
U.S. policy since I !lSI has had liUle erred in
ClII'bing South Asian pl'OIiferalion.
I\s described
above, Pakistan might currently he capable of
assemhling two to filllr nuclear wl~apons.
India
might be capable of assemhling twenty to fifty.
While possihly forestalling a Pakistani nuclear test,
U.S. policy may have contributed to till' further
development of Pakh;tani capabilities.
Spector
explains:
U.S. law unambiguollsly specifics thaI aid will
he terminated ir Pakistan rahrkates a l'ompletc
nuclear weapon. Quite possihly, Pakistan will
I'cfrain from doing so, since the rcstridion
would not, in any even!., preven!. Islamabad
from obtaining a de facto IHldear ddl'nent by
building all the ncecHsary l'omponents and
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thereby remaining only "a screwdriver away"
frolll nucl~~ar arms.
On t.he other hand,
having seen the United States repeatedly back
away from terminating assistance because of
concerns
over
the
Soviet
presence
in
Afghanistan, Islamabad may reason that if it
quietly violates this slt"iclurl', U.S. law will he
amended to pl'rmit aid to continlle just as the
Symington AllIendlllPnt was modified in 1~'R 1
f()r this purpose (Spect.or I ~'H 7 1 I H).
While U.S. polky has fililed to inflllence
Pakist.an's nllclear decisions, it has ahm increased
insecurity am()ng I ndian decision-makers.
India
resent.s t.he extensive military aid given to Pakist.an
since I HH 1. Ilaass explains ImJia'l) fear:
Indians resent U.S. military sllpport. fiJr
Pakistan even more.
American explanations
t.hat t.he aid is provided in t.he cont.ext of
Afghanist.an and not. the Indo-Pakistani rivalry
ca .... y little wat.er in New Delhi; similar glosses
in the past. did not prevent. U.S. arms from
being used against. Indian targets (llaass 1!tHR,
Ill).
Among India's defense establishment, this resentment
extends to insecurity. Indian Defense Minister K.C.
Pant. in an address bdilt"(~ India's Parliamcnt. on
April 27, HlH7, denounced U.S. policy for ignoring
Pakistan's search fill" nudear capability. Ill' fllrt.her
claimed that "linkages between t.he U.S., China, and
Pakistan, . wit.h anti-Indian oVl'rt.ones, have become
more and more pl"Onollnl"l'd" (SPlh 1!lHH, 712).
TIH'se ("edings of ins('t'lirily add to tlw pressures for
an Indian bomh. Pant's addn'ss confirms this: "The
enwrging nudear t.hn'at. to liS from Pakistan is
fi,,"cing liS" to review 0111' opt ions.
I alll sure the
IIOllse dOl~S nllt l~xpl'd Ille 10 detail this option as
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also our reHponHe whidl will Ill' adt'lJllate to our
pern'ption of t he threat" (Sdh 1!IHH, 7 12). Clearly,
thiH statement is a thinly veiled reference 1.0 the
nudear option.
But even though India feels threatened over U.S.
policy t~)ward Pakistan, U.S.-Indo relatiolls have still
improved sOllwwhal.
After a long tlrought, the
Unitetl States began U) ."eevaluate lntlia in I UHf».
Fred Ikle, then llnden;ccrcl.ary of Ddl'nse lill' Polil~y,
staled that t.he emergence of India as a world power
created an "exciting possibility that opens a new
chapter in United States-Indian relations" (\Vi» 4
May 1HH5, I).
Ikle seemed to be expressing the
recognition of the National Security Council's 1UH4
National Secu.-ity Decision Direelive (NSllll) 147.
NSDf)
147 advised the U.S. foreign policy
establishment U) establish better relations with India.
A year lalcr a memorandum of understanding on
technology transfer signed in t HH4 was put into
efreel.
Prime
Minister Oandhi viewed the
memorandum as an important indicatHr of improved
U.S.-Indo relations (Mukerjee I!lH7, (jOt).
In
addition IH the drastically increased industrial
cooperation resulting fmlll the memorandum, the
Unilcd Slates and India have also pursued milita.·y
cooperation.
While tiandhi told the U.S. press that American
military supply was unreliable OVP t 4 .June I UH5),
New Delhi has nevertheless been receiving U.S.
military sales since 1!)Hti, induding its purchase of
the (; I~ 404 engine lill" its newly planned light
combat aircraft (IIaass t BHH, t to). By early I !lH7
some Indian leaders had become more tolerant of
the U.S.-Pakistani security arrangement.
Writt~s
Hilip M ukeajec, a long time observer of South Asian
politics:
Though official Indian pronouncements continue
to describe lJ.S. military commitments I~)
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Paki~tan as excessive, the tone has generally
been less shrill... New Delhi may be ready to
live with a U.S.-Pakistani security partnership
provided
Washillgtoll
guards
against
destabilizing the regional military balancc and
extends help to India's endeavor to keep lip
with advances in milit.ary technology (Mukerjee

IHH7, H()!).

In October HlH7 <:andhi visited Washington. This
visit seemed to further allay Indian fears. Writes
Seth, "Prime Minister <:iHldhi detected a distinct
shift in the U.S. position on Pakistall's nudear
ambitions, and he rcportedly was assured hy
President Reagan that the United St.ales would take
action against. Pakistan if it wellt ahead with its
nuclear weapons program" (Seth I !IHH, 7~5).
Bul lhese assllrance~ seem to have been empty
given lhe cu ....ent Unitcd Stat.es aid agreement with
Pakistan passed in I!lH 7. The bill thal authorizes
the U.S.-Pakistani aid agreement. also seems to
discriminate against India.
While exempting
Pakistan rrom presidential certilication as described
above, it also includes a provision that "no countr·y
in South Asia may recClve U.S. aid or buy
sophisticated U.S. technology unless the presidl'lIt
determines that is not producing weapons-grade
mate.·ial" WJ~J.~U ~ .. Decemi.JCr I!lH7, 24).
While
exempting Pakistan from this st.ipulat.ion, the bill is
silent on India's status. To date, the law seems to
have little effed on U.S. technical assistance to
India.
But reports indicatl'd t.hat "the move has
angt;red Indian of"fieials--indllliing Primc Minister
Rajiv Gandhi--as, for the lirst time, till' bill would
put the Indian alld Pakistani nuclear programmes Oil
a par alld the 0I1US Oil India to prevl'nt nudear
proliferation ill South Asia" (/··I·~·I';N ~I D(~t"l'mbl'r
IHH7, ~4).
This n'lwwed inst'nsitivity S('('I1\S to
thn'atcn improving 1I.S.-lndo n·lations.
An April
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I !)HH visil 10 New Delhi by lI.S. Dpfl'nsl' Set'l"etary
Frank Carlucci "gave Iii til' salisfadioll 10 India on
ils cOlll'erns oVl'r Pakist an."
In fad, Cal"llll'ci
indicated Ihal U.S. mililary assislalu'p tAl Pakistan
would cont.inue unchangl,d despit.e Ihe impending
Soviet pull-out 1"1"0111 Afghanistan WEI';/{ 21 April
I HHR, :W).
This intent.ion to continue providi ng
military aid can pl"Obably be cxplained by skcpticism
ovcr Soviet intl'ntions in Afghanist.an.
But t.hc
cOllt inlled emphasis Oil East.- West security isslles is
undermining non-pl"Oliferat,ion efforts in South Asia.
The United Slat.es must. recognize that. there is lillie
risk of Soviet expansion int.o the Persian Gulf and
South Asia.
Recognizing this should not be lA,o
diflicult given the pullout of Soviet. troops from
Afghanistan in Fl'bruary I mm filllowing a peace
agreement reached in neneva on April 14, I !)HH.
Also, t.he Soviets have given up any hope of
maintaining the communist Najibullah regime after
the pull-out, making the stability of this rcgimc a
non-issue in tcrms of the Geneva agreement (CSM
22 November 10HR, I). In fad, the Soviets have
ah'eady begun building relat.ions with the rehels. In
October the Soviets extended $(iOO million of aid to
help rebuild post-war Afghanistan (/·;.·otlom;sl 22
October I BHR, 44).
Also, prisoncr cxchange talks
started in lat.e Novembcr havc bl"Oadened into wider
talks on t.he post-pullout transfer of pOWl'r (CSM l)
lJe(,l'mbel' I !tHR, I).
Clearly, t.he Soviets have
accepted military defeat. and do not intend to persist
wit.h lhe war. II opef"ulIy , U.S. policymakl·rs will be
convinced that nuclear proliferat.ion, not. Soviet
expansionism, is thc real sccurity pl'Ohlcm in South
Asia.

NUCLI~AR PROLIFI~RATION

NON-PHOLIFEI{ATION IN SOUTII
ASIA: A NI~W APPROACH
li'OR U.S. POLICY
As argucd prcviously, thc problems of South
Asian proliferation arc real and potentially severe.
U.S. policy must be adjusted to more effectively
address these prohlems. Initially, the policy needs
to work loward JlI'evenling Iluclear deployment.
Nexl, the Uniled Slales musl work toward
preventing prolift.~rati()11 he yond South Asia. Finally,
,"egional arms control and disarmamenl should he
promoted to prcvent further (fevciopmcnt. of IndoPakistani nuclear capahilities and t.he potential
demise of the Non- Prolifemlion Treaty (N PT).
Prevenling N uclcat, Deployment
As highlight.ed frequenlly throughout LlIlS paper,
neilher India nor Pakislan have deployed nuclear
weapons, even though both nations arc probably
weapons capable. COIHH'qllenlly, a reasonable short
lc,'m goal f(U" lJ ,S. poliey is to prevent deployment.
To achieve this goal, it is important. to
understand the mot ivcs as well as the disincenlivcs
fiu" nuclear deployment in South Asia. The primary
motives to deploy IIllde"r weapons in South Asia
arc security rehtted: India's fi.'an, of P,Ikist.ani and
Chinese hostility, and Pilkislan's ft.'al's
Indian and
Soviet hostility. The disincenlivcs will he describcd
below. To prevent /luclear deployment, U.S. policy
Illllst be designcd to rl'ducc the motives ,Ind enhance
thc disincentives of nudcar deploYIlll'nt in both India
and Pakistan.
Reducing molives rcquires an improvcll1l'nl in the
security c'nvironllll'nt or South Asia.
The most
dil'cel way fiu' the llnitl'd Slatl's 1.0 cnhancc the
security environlllcnt is through ils military aid
policies.
The presidcnt should "exercise his
discretionary authorily to wilhhold rmlll Pakistan at
least seleded advanCl,d ("onvl'ntional wI'allons syslems
that :Irc not essenl ial for defendillg Pakistan's
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Afghan bonier" (ltaass 1~IHH, 1 10). This would help
to ease Indian fears of an overly al'lIll'd Pakistan,
thus rcdm'ing t he risk /tll' war.
To a point.,
reductions in U.S. military aid to Pakistan may
improvl' t.he securit.y environment ill Sol.t.h Asia.
Bul t.hese redudions would need to be balanced with
Pakistani Sl'CUl'ity perceptions. Pakisl.\ni rears must
a\so he t.aken into ,H:count in U.S. military trans/cl's
10 India. In general, all U.S. milit.ary aid and sales
t.o Sout.h Asia should Ill' evaluated to ddl'nnine their
enL~d. on Indo-Pakistani security perceptions.
U.S. policy should also help Illdia and Pakistan
in their ongoing efforts to improve bilat.eral relations.
After achieving a partial dell'lIll' in the lin;t half of
the decade, Indo- Pakistani I'd,,1 ions seem to again
Le souring.
There have bCl'1I 110 high-level talks
between India and Pakistan sincl' February 1HH 7.
following the FeLruary mcet ing, Indian President
Zail Singh re/clTed to Pakistani support of Sikh
terrorists in the Northeast. Indian province or Punjab
as a major ohstade to improved Indo-Pakistani
relations W/t;/t;U 12 March 1!lH7, :W).
Since last
yeal: over two t.housand people have been killed in
stepped-up
t.e ....ol'ist
attacks
following
India's
imposition or direct rule over Punjab. The Indian
government also suspects Pakistan of supplying Sikh
lcrrorist.s with sophisticat.ed weaponry, including US
machine guns and Stingel' missiles int.ended IiiI' the
Afghan resist.ance Wl~lal 14 April IHH8, :W-7).
These developments in Punjab seem t.o have sOUl'ed
Indo-Pakistani rclatitlns.
But India may be starling t.o I't'cogniw their own
responsibility /ill' the instability in Pun.iab.
In
SeptemLer 1H88 Gandhi visited Pun.iab in an
unpl'ecedent.ed ellt)rl to reconcile dillcl'CI1Ces wilh
PunjuLi Sikhs. During lhe trip Iw anllounced a new
government investment Jlackagt~ worth $fi()() million
to Punjab. While the tClTorist.s 1'l'''USt~ to Iwgoliat.c
with the Indian g()vcl'IIlIlent., (:andhi's visit may
mark the I)egilllling of a political seUll~lIIellt.
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PunjaLi im;tability (I';cllllOm;sl 24 September 1!IHH,
41-2). Indeed, eadier in the year some factions of
the Sikh tel'l'orisb seemed to indicate a willingness
to reach a settlement with Ihe Indian government
(f.':collomisl B April I !IHH, :1!1).
Pl'IIgress ill Punjab
would undoubtedly have a positive efrect on IndoPakistani ,-elations_
Besides Punjab, another recent
development may scrve to undermine Indo-Pakistani
relations.
On Decemher I, I BHH, India expelled
Pakistan's senior military attache, Z_1. Abasi, on
charges of spying.
This will undoubtedly hurt
relations in the short term, but it may also have a
more long term effect.
One Western diplomat in
Islamabad said, "This could stiffen resistance 110
diplomatic overtures I within Pakistan's military_
This will certainly not increase I Prime Minister
Bhutto'sl mnge in dealing with the Army" (CSM 2
December I HH8, !I).
The newly appointed BhuUo
could be effectively prevented from improving
relations with India as she works to maintain
sUppot·t fmm the milita,-y.
I~ven though Indo-Pakistani relations seem to be
souring, the United States can still usc its inlluence
to encourage the two nations to come to a better
understanding_ U.S. policy should also be desiglll'd
to pmmote specific confidence building measures that
enhance the Indo-Pakistani security environment.
These might include agrecmcnts t~) "limit thc size,
numbe,-, and loeale of military exercises, provide
wlvance notification of exclTises, and pl'nnit the
exchange of ohservers_
Demilitarized zones would
also contJ.:ibute I~) stability" (llam;s 1!IHH, 112).
These types of measures would serve to avoid
intermittent border clashes that threaten to ignite
another Indo-Pakistani war.
The promotion of
conlidence-Luilding IlWa:-ilIH'S might also include
encouraging the conclusion of a Iw-war part and I he
signing of a nudl'ar non-aggression treaty agreed to
ill prilll-iple hy Ualldhi and Zia ill 1m~f). A lIudear
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non-aggression treaty would serve to dccrease the
risk of' a milit.ary strike on nudear fal'ilities. All of
t.hese measures would have a significant. inlluence in
n~llucing lhe risk of war hl'lwl'l'n
India and
Pakislan.
Bul Pa kislan is not. India's only Sl'cul'ity th,·eal.
India also feels t.hnwtened Ly China. The nat.ions
have been enemies since I BH'2, when t.hey foughl a
war along lhe Tibelan border that India losl. Bul
India and China have llegun 1,1) improve their'
relations sincc J !lRO. .John Garver of Uw Georgia
Institute of Technology documents t.he "remarkable
transformation" of Chinese polil"y toward India:
Beijing has explicilly acknowledged India's "big
brolher" role in Sout.h Asia, adopt.cd a ncut.ral
posilion on llw I<ashmi.. issue, stAlpped
suppOlting insurgencies within India, begun
encou .. aging amity rather than cnmity he tween
India and its neighbo .. s, and sought to expand
bilateral
Indian-Chinese
.. elations
while
negotiating on the border question (<tarver
JU8?,121U).

India has also reevaluated it.s policy toward China.
According to Nancy .Jet.ly or t.he School of
Int.ernational St.udies at ,Iawhadal Neh .. u University,
India is "exploring all avenues--polit.ical, diplomatic,
and unol"licial--lo speed lhe Lorder lalks wilh China"
WI~'/~U U April
U)R?, 40).
India also withheld
public support for a Tibetan up .. ising in late 1U8?,
resisting the temptation lo cncourage instability and
create further prohlcms fill' China (I"IU·:1l 22 Odohcr
I U8?, I :n. In Novemher I BR? China and India mel
in New Delhi lo discuss lhe llo .. der question and
olhe.. isslles, llolt. sides ag ..ccing "t.o a void conflid
and confrontat.ion along t.hei .. nlllt lIal b" .. dt· ... "
In
March I HRR lhey had laid t.1lt' groundwork for a
fulu .. e s('ttleml'lll of the bonier issue.
Thpy also
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agreed to meet again in laIc I !lkH WIO.;/l !I .June
1!IHH, :0-2).

Although lhe improvement in Sino-Indian relations
is cause ror great optimism, India's defense
establishmenl remains skepticaL An April reporl to
Parliament. by the Indian Defense Ministry noted
thal "China was continuing lo upgrade its logist.ics,
communicat.ion net.work and military airfields in
Tibet" W[';[';U !I .June I HHH, :12).
In its bilateral relations with both natiom;, t.he
Unit.ed Slates should encourage China and India t.o
continue their dialogue, also enClluraging t.hem to
limit. and event.ually reduce military ad.ivities in the
border region. To accomplish lhis, lhe Unit.ed States
musl bolster its slipping influence wit.h China. Over
the past year, U.S.policy makers have expressed
rrustration over Chinese policy in Tibet and Chinese
missile sales to North Korea and Iran. U.S. leadel's
aI'e also nervous about. growing Chines lies wit.h lhe
Soviet Union ([.';conom;st !I .January I HHH, 2B). U.S.
leaders need to be aware that. pushing China on the
Tibet and missile sales issues might. decrease its
influence on lhe Sino-Indian security equat.ion, thus
in the long t.el'm undermining its abilit.y t.o enhance
Indian secul'ity and reduce proliferation pressures in
South Asia .
•J ust as Pakistan is nol India's only security
llll'eat, India is nol Pakist.an's only security t.hreat.
Since the Afghan invasion, Pakist.anis have fl~ared
Soviet expansionism into Sout.h Asia. While these
leal'S have been drast.ically rl'dun~d since t.he Soviet
pullout, Pakistan still feels uneasy.
lIowever,
Soviet-Pak.istani relat.ions have improved sOIlll'what.
over t he past. two years part Iy lJt'c<lusl' of limit.ed
Suviet. economic aid. which the Sovil'ls have hinted
will cont.inue Wnlllomisl I (j, April
I !IHH, :I!I).
Anot.her conel'de llle,'!HII'e l:ould lIl' t.aken to allay
Pakistani rears, This would he t he establishment 0('
a non-aggression pad IIl't.wl'l'n I{lIssia and Pakistan.
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Both the Soviet Union and Pakistan have expressed
the desire for sueh an arrangclllcnt, but neither
nation has taken action to formalize an agreement
(Council on Foreign Relations I m'Hi, I a).
The
United States could ,'emind hot.h natioils of this
Opt.iOIl,
cllcounlging tIle IIaliolls 1,(1 'sigll a 1)011aggI'Cssillll pact. T/,;s measure Willi II} gI'Catly I'Cduce
Pakistan; (cm's, I,hus mlieviJlg a sOlll'ce of PI'CSSlII'C

I~) deploy nuclear weapons.
The use of military aid
and diplomatic influence described above is designed
only to reduce the primary motive to deploy nuclear
weapons: insecurity.
U ,S. policy also needs to be
designed to emphasize disincentives to deployment,.
Fortunately, lhere are many strong disincenlives.
India realizes thal deploymenl could lead to lhe
chilling of Russian relalions, lhe deslruction of
improving Amel"ican relalions, and the imposilion of
severe economic sanctions f!'Om the Wesl (Spector
lOS 7, SB). Pakistan realizes that t hl-'y arc int'apable
of competing wilh India in a nudear arms race.
They also (cm' a powntially adverse reaction from
the Soviet Union. I n ,I une I !18ti t he Soviets warned
Pakistan thal its deployment of' nudear weapons
would conslitute a t.hreal to Southern Russia lo
which Moscow "cannot 1m indifferenl" (WI) 15 ,'uly
1H8H, 1),
Pakistan also fean; the more dclinit.e
pruspect of an adverse American reaction lranslaling
into an elimination of military aid and an imposition
of' broader sanctions.
Again,
the
most direI'!, way
to enhalH'e
disincentives is through military aid, lIowever, 1I.K
leaders should not considcr relH'wing the prc-l07!)
aid sanctions approaeh to non-proliferation by
applying the Symington or Solarz Amelllimenls.
Mililary aid needs 10 continuc 10 be disburscd while
a credible threat is established that sanctions will be
applied if the (Il11'suit of nuclcar capabilities is not
curt.ailed.
Phillip GUill/net of' Ihe Universily of'
MalH:hesler explains how a counlry's llIilitary
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bUI'caucracy can oe influenced to forestall nuclear
deployment:
Military
((,rces
are
notorious
for
their
reluclance to accept new technology, especially
wherc this threatens existing missions or roles.
There is also plenty of evidence from around
the world of resistance oy one branch of the
armed forces to the acquisition oy another of
anything which may increase its relative
status.
lIence, military forces will not
nccessarily automatically and unanimously
support a decision to aClJuire nuclear weapons ...
A continuous supply of advanced t~onvent.ional
arms could be offered, on condition that the
rcdpicnt armcd serviccs played it.s part in
delaying a decision to acquire lor deploy I
nuclcar weapons «( iummet ill Simpson I !lH7,
145-t)).

Today, this policy might have a signilictlnt clTect on
Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, since the stat.us of
Pakistani armed forces has become increasingly tied
to U.S. military aid and the military establishment
has also become an important. center of power in
Pakistan.
Tradit.ional aid embargocs are not the only way
to institute aid sanctions.
,·'Iuduat.ing thc amount
of aid in relation t.o the pursuit of nuclear ambitions
could of reI' a promising alternative to a eomplcte
aid embaq~(). P.-ovision of aid docs not nced to bc
an either-~)r issuc.
For instancc, with Pakist.an a
billion-dollar pcnalty could be levied for failure to
halt uranium cnrichment programs or a bonus t:ould
bc offercd for yielding the facilities to IAEA
safeguards. Aid fluctuations could pl'Ovide a way to
excrcisc influcncc without sacrificing flex ibility.
Thcsc mcasurcs· could havc a decisive clh'd on
Pakist.an's decisioll to deploy lIudear weapons.
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Unfortunately,
U.S.
aid
to
India
IS too
insignificant 10 have a lil-dsive erfed, but concert.ed
lTlultilat.l'ral eflill"ts could pruVl- to "l' '1l1ile clfedivc.
Initially, India has dose til'S wit.h till' Soviet Union,
making supcrpOWl'r l:ooJll'rat ion in Sout.h Asian nonproliferat.ion policy quit.c aUradivc. Spedor & Stahl
suggcst. that. thc issuc could lw discusscd at. thc ncxt
superpower summit (Spcd-or and Slahl I ~IHH, :1:1).
A SUPCI'P0WCI" agl'ccllll'nl t.o l'Olllhat. JlI'oliferation in
South Asia could {:onsist of a division of labor where
the United Stat.es would seck lo inlluenCl~ its ally
Pakistan, and the Sovicts would seck to inllucncc its
ally India.
Thc cfli)rt.s wuld be wordinated to
maximize
innucllcc,
bot.h
sidcs
agrecing
to
{'onsistcntly apply sanl'lions and rcwards,
lJ .S.Soviet cooperation could probahly hc a significant
l'actOl' in managing prolifcration in South Asia given
that t.he dcploymcnt disinccntivcs or both India and
Pakistan include rear of superpower displeasure.
Multilateral cooperation t.o cnhance deployment.
disincentives could also include clli,rt.s through thc
Nuclear Supplicl's' Group (NSm. The United States
should excl'cise its influcnce in the NSU to rormulate
a consensus concerning sanctions in the event India
or Pakistan dcploy wcapons.
This could be
significant as the Council on Foreign Relations
concludes, "The aggregate of all economic and
military assistance provided t.o India by members of
the NSU is significant enough t~1 pl'Ovide a potent.ial
multilateral disincentive t.o I'Ut,ther pl'Oliferatory acts."
(Council on I. . ordgn Hdations I ~IHlj, I H).
NSn
policy could abo dircdly affcct India's nudear
policies, Spcdor explains:
India remains depcndcnt on cxt.ernal sourccS
fi,," OIlC key comlllodit y, hell v y watcr, whidl is
essential to thc oppratioll of most of its
nudear reactA)rS, including the Dhrllva and
Madras plants that are t:ent.ral t.o India's
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nuclear-weapons (·apabilit.y .. , Tight.ened cont.rols
on nudear supplies might have a grealcr
impad on India's nudear supplies than is
generally believed (Spector H)S7, !l2-:n,
Gummct suggests that "elements of the Indian
bureaucratic and scientific elite have been prepamd
to pnHnot.e 'Western' arguments in order to ensure
a continuous supply of nuclear technology and
malcrials" (Gummet in Simpson H187, 145). Thus,
just as the threat. of U.S. aid sandions could be
used to influence the military bureaucracy in
Pakistan, the threat. of NSG sanctions might be used
t.o influence the nucleat' power bureaucracy in India
as well as ot.her cenlct·s or power. In the end, t.he
influence generalcd by t.hese two sand.ions policies
may be enough to '()rest.all the decision to deploy
nuclear weapons.
This influence might. also he used t.o persuade
India and Pakist.an to pursue confidence-building
measures specifically relalcd to t.heir nuclear
progt'ams. One or these measures is a Ill'ar-nlldear
weapons states' code of behavior. Suggested by M.,)'
Wilmhurst of the British delegation to t he I A I~A, it
could consist or the f(,lIowing point.s:
I.

2.

:l.

All import.ed and indigenous nuck-ar plants
and material would be placed under I A 1<: A
sareguards, wit.h the except.ion of those
specified plants and mat.erials t.hat. are
deemed essential to nat.ional security,
An undert.aking would be givl·n neit.her t.o
manuracture nor to t.est a nuclear
explosive device except under circumst.ances
of a grave lIneat. to national securit.y.
A commitmenl would be made t.o adhere
t.o the N PT as soon as ohslacles based on
questions of national security havl' been
t'emoved (Wilmhurst. in Simpson and
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McGrew 1ntH, 1,HI).
If instituted,
this agreement would
preclude
deployment while at the sallle time setting the basis
r(lr longer t.erm solutions.
Of course, these policies might fail and India and
Pakistan could deploy nuclear weapons anyway. If
deployment does O(Tur, U.S. policy should shift from
prevcntion to management.
Baass desc\'ibes the
appropriate measures or a management policy:
The United Siaies would want to wOl·k with
both Pakistan and India lo promOle arms
control and to enhance their command and
control systems to lessen the likelihood of
accidental war.
It could even selectively
enhance nuclear eapabilities tAl strengthen
rctaliatory potential and, thus, reinforce mutual
delerrence (lbass I HHH, I 17).
But if the policies to pl'event deployment are
implement.ed by the United States, the management
of an Indo-Pakistani nuclea\' deterrent can probably
be avoided.
But the prevention of deployment
should not be the only goal of U.S. non-proliferation
policy in South Asia.
U.S. policy should also be
designed lo prevent extra-regional proliferation.
PI'eventing Pmliferation
Beyond South Asia
The primary policy for preventing prolircration out
of South Asia is broadening and improving the
cUlTent NSG. Initially, as the Council on Foreign
Relations concluded in 1UHn, the membership of t.he
NSn needs to be broadened to indudc India and
Pakistan (Couneil on I"oreign Itelatiolls I ~IH(i, I H).
As docunwnted above, both India and Pakistan have
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t.he pot.ential to become significant Iluclear suppliers.
The Unit.ed St.at.es needs t.o adively pun;ue
expanding the membership of the present NSG. A
new NSG should include all current and potential
supplie.·s, including India and Pakistan. This should
be a f()I·mal group that meet.s regularly to discuss
nuclear export st.andards.
Besides expanding t.he NSG, its current. export.
standards need to be reevaluated. To begin with,
existing nuclear safeguards are not consistent among
nuclea.· supplier::;. While the United States' export
standaJ·ds arc very strid, those of Canada and
Western Europe are rdatively lenient (Walker in
Simpson and
McGrew
I !lS4, H?-n).
These
inconsistencies are complicated by a recession in the
nuclear maJ·ket that "places further pressures on
supplier governments to relax their standards or at
least to .·esist any upgrading thereof" (Moher in
DeWitt IUS?, !l4). And the existing st.andard::; arc
not very restridive to begin wit.h.
David Fischer
and Paul Szasz of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institut.e desnibe t.he problems of cu .... ent
NSG guidelines, "They place no embargo Oil the
expOl·t of the technologies that can he direelly used
to
make
nuclear ex plosives, enrichment and
reprocessing. They do not require full scope I A EA
safegua.·ds in the impoJ'ling country as a condition
of supply" (Fischer and Szasz I HH5, 10:1).
The United Siales should encourage t.he adoplion
of consistent. st.andards wit.hin t.he NS(i.
These
st.andards would include consistent crit.eria till· till'
export of sensit.ive tecllllologies and consist.ent criteria
t.o asses's when full scope safeguards are appropriate
as a condition of ex pori. At. I he lInit.(~d Nations the
NS(I should conSilII extensively wit.h till' I A I~A and
all members of the NPT t.hrough lI.N. confl'n'nn~s
and assemhlies.
All NPT stat.es should have a
chance t.o conirilllllc to the formulation of NSU
sLuuianis.
This will help avoid perceptions Ihat.
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NSG countries are fOl'lnulat.in~ a nudear tel'hnology
monopoly. U.N. participation will also cont.ribut.e to
t.he access of rdevant. t.echnolo~ies for all nalions
seeking genuindy peaceful nudear capahilities.
If t.he NSU is expanded t.o inl'lude Pakistan and
I ndia and strengthened to bett.er limit. t.he risk of
weapons prolifl~rat.ion, the spread of nul'lear weapons
from Sout.h Asia will be a minor threat.
But a
complete Sout.h Asian non-proliferation policy must
promote arms cont.rol and event.ual disarmament in
South Asia.

and

Promoting Anns Cont.1'01
Disarmament in South Asia

Arms control in South Asia should be designed
to maintain the nudear stat.us quo in South Asia.
Speetor & Stahl suggest three arms cont.I'ol
measlII'es designed to maintain the nurlcar status
quo:
1.
2.

:1.

A formal, H'eiprocal ball Oil nlldear test.s,
which eould he renewed pl'riodil~ally.
Fixed duralion, rccipl'Ol'al illsped.ions of
key nudear installations, to vl~riry that
nudear materials are IlOt. heing used f(lr
military purposes.
Verifiable,
temporary
shutdowns
of
sensit.ive nudear weapons mat.erials plants
(Spedor and St.ahl I H8H, :I:H.

The first pl'Oposal seems particularly aUradive to
the South Asian situal\on.
Pakislall has already
pl'Oposed a regional t.est. han, It. would be "highly
advantageous to India silll"e it would preserve India's
lead in this field while hdping to wnst.rain further
Pakistani proliferation." The sewnd measure could
be open to periodic renewal, whill' preventing
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"additions to both countries' de fado nuclear
weapons stockpiles as long as it was in effect."
The third measure could ahlO freeze existing
stockpiles "without necessitating on-site inspections,
since whethel' a plant was shut down could probably
be det.ermined from sat.ellit.e data or from ag,'eed
phot.oreconnaisance overflights or other cooperat.ive
measures" (Spector and Stahl lHHH, :I:n,
These measures should be promoted by U,S,
diplomats in New Delhi and Islamabad, The United
States could also offer t'(l help negotiate agreements,
provide ve.-ification for the measures, or arrange for
another more agreeable third party to assist India
and Pakistan in their bilateral arms control efforts.
There are also multilateral efforts that would
serve U) f,'eeze the nuclear status quo in South
Asia. One of lhese effOl,ts could be a mullinational
fuel cycle center (Fischer and Szasz 19H5, 112).
This would provide one spent fuel reprocessing planl
for lhe region. And even lhough both Pakistan and
India have built their own reprocessing and
enrichment plants, the establishment and use of
these facilities could still serve t.() freew the
su)ckpiling of pluumium and enriched uranium. In
the long term the United States might increase the
viability of this proposal by offering financial
compensation for the Indian and Pakistani plants
that. would no longer be needed in the event of a
viable
regional
reprocessing
plan.
Another
multilateral approach might be a multinat.ional spent.
fuel cente... This would provide one facility fill' the
region UI SUIre spent fuel (Fischer and Szasi'. 1HH5,
1 1:1).
If est.ablished and used, this facility would
eliminat.e t,he viability of plutonium reprocessing,
Again, the Unit.ed Stales could offer financial
compensation U) inncast' the proposal's viahility.
Beyond arms conI 1'01 is disarmament.. Olle way
t'(l promote dis;u'IlHU1Wllt ill Soulh Asia is I he
establishllll'nt. of a lIudea.. w('apolls fn't' zOlle

5H
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(N W I"Z).
This would ban nuclear weapons from
South Asia. So far, India has rejected Pakistan's
proposal fiJr a N W fi'Z because it docs not include
China, who has intermediate range nuclear ~eapons
stati()ned in Tibet. (,Jian in Goldblat HlH5b, 97). To
a large extent., a South Asian NWFZ depends on
Sino-Indian relations.
In addition to encouraging
India and China to continue improving their
rclalions, the United States could also encourage
China to disarm along the Tibetan border.
This
would Jlmbably go fa.· toward convincing India of the
desimbility of a NWFZ.
Probably the best disarmament measure in t.he
long term is to integrate India and Pakistan into the
intel'llational non-proliferation regime--the N PT and
the IAI~A.
lIowever, Pakistan will not join the
N PT unless India docs. And India has opposed the
NPT since its inception. Ambassador Azim lIusain
presented India'!; reasons for rejecting the NPT in
his I ~.(iH address t() the United Nations 1t)lIowing the
treaty's adoption. Rodney ,Jone!; of the Center for
Strau'gic and International Studies pruvides a useful
summary of the ambassador's arguments (,Jones in
Goldblat W85b, 104). fi'irst, India claimed that the
treaty was discriminatory, justifying the possession
of nuclear weapons for some states and condemning
t.heir possession for others. Second, the treaty does
not est.ablish mutual obligat.iom; hdween nuclear
suppliers and constllners. Finally, China was nol a
party lo the treaty, so India withheld its support to
maint.ain its nuclear opt.ion against a potential
nudear-anned adversary.
China also rejeels the
treaty on the grounds t.hat it discriminal.cs, just.ifying
the
possession of nudear
weapons by
tile
superpowers
while
implicitly
condemning
the
possession of weapons by other powers.
Given this reasoning, it seems t.hat the onus of
ex panding the N PT inl~) South Asia lies wit.h
superpower efforts at. arms control and disarmament..
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Thc U.S.lSovicl agreement to eliminatc intennediate.-ange nudear f(1I·ces (INF treaty) in Decem~er HIH7
was a giant step towUl·d legitimating the N PT for
countr·ies like India and China.
Prime Minister
Gandhi praised the IN F treaty in thc Illt/iall lIwL
J.'orcign /(cview, calling it a "truly momentous
development. to Progress on Stratcgi(· Arms Reduct.ion
Talks (START) could also have a significant impact
on South Asian non-proliferation. <lalilihi indicated
in Oct.oLer InS7 during his visit to Washington that
"progress Itowards N PT participation I mighl be
possihle in the context of superpower nudear
cutbacks" (CSM 14 Decembcr I !lH7, 7).
START
calb (ill· a fifty percent redudion in the overall
nudear arsenals of the superpowers. In April I !lHH
the last di/liculties were worked out in terms of
weapons ceilings, making till' agreement dependent
on the signatures of pn~sident -dpd George Bush and
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.
The START
agreement is virtually completed.
After the completion of START between the
superpowers, its stipulations should be integrated into
Article V I of the N PT. Also, a multilateral summit
discussing the positive and negative points of the
treaty could be Iwld with all interested world
nations.
This internationalization of the START
treaty could help further reduce perceptions that the
N PT docs not apply to t he superpowers.
These
perceplions could be further reduced if subsequent
superpower arms redm:tions WCI'C worked out in the
context of the N PT.
The end result of these
measures could be an increased spirit of cooperation
fiJI" world-wide disarmament.
U.S. policy Illust soon be adjusted to avoid
further proliferation ill South Asia.
While some
would say that the full nudearization of South Asia
is inevitable, there is reason to be optimistie that
South Asian proliferation can hc CUdICd. The Sovicl
pullout from Afghanistan, the appointment of Prime

(jO
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Minisler Bhutto in Pakistan and her desires for
improved Indo-Pakistani rdations, improved SinoIndian relations, as well as giant sleps being made
toward superpower disarmament are all cause for
hope that nudear weapons will not he part of the
Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Bul these dl~vdopinents will
also requirl' a propel' U.S. response if their benefits
are to be fully realized. If Ihe United States allows
military aid and sales 10 pl'l'Jll'tuate insl·curity in
South Asia or somehow allows the disarmament
process t.o he derailed, then the siluation in South
Asia could significantly deteriorate.
And if this
occurs, there arc plenty of reasons to bdieve that
the region will become Lhe second vidim of atomic
holocaust in Asia.
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